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On Obscenity: The Thrill and Repulsion of the Morally Prohibited 
Matthew Kieran, University of Leeds 
 
Abstract 
The paper proceeds by criticising the central accounts of obscenity proffered by Feinberg, Scruton and the 
suggestive remarks of Nussbaum and goes on to argue for the following formal characterization of obscenity: x 
is appropriately judged obscene if and only if either A/ x is appropriately classified as a member of a form or 
class of objects whose authorized purpose is to solicit and commend to us cognitive-affective responses which 
are (1) internalized as morally prohibited and (2) does so in ways found to be or which are held to warrant 
repulsion and (3) does so in order to a/ indulge first order desires held to be morally prohibited or b/ indulge the 
desire to be morally transgressive or the desire to feel repulsed or c/ afford cognitive rewards or d/ any 
combination thereof or B/ x successfully elicits cognitive-affective responses which conform to conditions (1)-
(3). 
 
I: Introduction 
What is it for something to be obscene? The question is both interesting philosophically and of practical import. 
Its practical significance most obviously stems from the ethical and political disputes concerning obscenity and 
the fact that many states prohibit public obscenity. Hence it is important to be clear about just what may be 
considered obscene and why. More generally, in contemporary Western society at least, there is a tendency 
amongst certain groups to bemoan a perceived increasing indulgence in and glorification of obscenity. In order 
to know whether the complaint is justified or not, and whether as is often assumed this marks a decline in the 
moral character of contemporary society, we need to know just what obscenity is. The philosophical interest of 
the question is perhaps a little less obvious. It is a fact that many people get extremely worked up with respect 
to what they judge to be obscene. Yet this is rather puzzling. Obviously the notion of obscenity is not a simple, 
descriptive concept. To deem something to be obscene is to judge it to be extremely bad in some way. It is a 
concept part of the content of which carries a strong negative evaluation. Yet many of us commonly judge 
certain actions or attitudes to be very bad or immoral without becoming strident, heated or vexatious in our 
condemnation of them. Why then should many people do so in condemning obscenity? The answer cannot 
simply be that obscenity just is that which is extremely bad or immoral, in which case obscenity would merely 
be an uninteresting rhetorical term. For we often judge that certain actions or attitudes are extremely immoral, 
serial adultery or callousness say, without any kind of concomitant affective response. Yet the judgment of 
obscenity seems intimately tied to rather strong negative affective responses that explain the vehemence of 
condemnation. 
 The default explanation, which the philosophical literature on the subject concentrates on heavily, is 
taken to concern causal considerations. The thought is that many people get so worked up because they are 
afraid that what they judge to be obscene will causally influence, directly or otherwise, people’s dispositions to 
behave in morally dubious ways or certain groups to be illegitimately silenced. The literature on whether such a 
thought is justified or not is extensive. But this cannot be right as an account of obscenity per se. Even if we 
grant that there are causal links from obscene representations to immoral acts or the preclusion of certain groups 
this cannot be sufficient for a representation to be obscene. For the causal assumption would apply to many 
things we do not judge to be obscene nor necessarily get so worked up about. For example, Buster Keaton’s 
films always represent women as shallow, giddy or stupid and someone might worry that watching many films 
of this kind may cultivate morally dubious attitudes or behavior with respect to women. But no-one would 
seriously condemn these kinds of films as obscene. Nor is the causal assumption necessary with respect to 
judging something to be obscene. A joke concerning, for example, my spitting on my grandmother’s grave may 
be deemed obscene without anyone thinking it would affect people’s dispositions regarding how they treat their 
grandparents. So the judgment of obscenity is prior to such causal considerations. Hence many people have 
strong affective responses to and condemn certain kinds of actions or representations as obscene without 
thereby assuming the kind of causal link postulated. In other words, most people would still have a strong 
affective reaction to and condemn that which is judged to be obscene even if they were aware that, ex hypothesi, 
it had been conclusively proved that there could be no significant causal influence upon the attitudes, 
dispositions and behavior of those who indulge in it. Thus for an informative characterization of obscenity we 
should look to accounts of it as a distinctive phenomenon prior to the standard causal considerations. 
 
II: Inadequate Accounts of Obscenity 
Joel Feinberg has argued that obscenity is essentially a charientic matter. A charientic judgment concerns the 
non-moral qualities of an action, representation or character. To judge people or actions as boorish, coarse, 
uncouth, uncivilized and the like is to condemn them as vulgar, whilst to praise them as being elegant, civilized 
or cultured is to praise them as being refined. Such judgments are not moral since they pick out a coarseness of 
mind or manner of behaving and, as such, are distinct from the moral character of a person or action. Someone 
who is coarse of mind, and thus charientically flawed, may yet be wholly morally admirable whilst one who is 
refined and civilized may yet be morally decadent and corrupt. So we must be careful to keep distinct the 
charientic and moral aspects of an action or representation. Obscenity, according to Feinberg, just is the most 
extreme, unqualifiedly negative kind of vulgarity. Hence the obscene is properly contrasted with both the 
immoral and the ugly. Moreover, we are or would be warranted in being deeply offended by obscenity - since 
extreme vulgarity is immensely unpleasant. Feinberg need not deny that the moral character of an action or 
representation may affect its charientic character. But it may only do so as an indirect side-effect - if and only if 
the moral character mars or promotes its charientic features such as its refinement, coarseness or vulgarity. For 
example, a couple may indulge in increasingly explicit foreplay in public and this may be considered immoral 
given the assumption that sexual activity should be an essentially private matter. But it is not, on Feinberg’s 
account, the putative immorality of the act that renders it obscene. Rather it is the incredibly vulgar lack of self-
restraint, which, in this case, is manifested in actions of a certain moral character. 
 One advantage of Feinberg’s account is that it provides a characterization of the way in which certain 
subject matter is not necessarily but may be rendered obscene - by virtue of the most coarse, explicit and vulgar 
expression. Pornography, as distinct from erotica say, is explicitly crude about the nature of sexual arousal, 
manifests a coarse, impoverished conception of sexual desire and the characters, such as they are, lack human 
interest. Moreover, it seems to capture the range of phenomena often deemed to be obscene since actions or 
representations concerned not just with sex but violence, death and disease can all be extremely vulgar in 
expression. 
 However, as an account of obscenity, Feinberg’s characterization can only be woefully inadequate. It 
is worth noting that Feinberg’s account does immense violence to ordinary language use of the term. 
Paradigmatic cases of obscenity are condemned straightforwardly as such, not merely in virtue of their extreme 
vulgarity. Of course this may only show that ordinary language use of the term is mistaken. But in the case of 
obscenity there is good philosophical reason why ordinary language use should be this way. 
 Feinberg’s identity claim cannot be right – obscenity is not just that which is extremely vulgar. 
Vulgarity is, in principle, to be distinguished from obscenity. On the one hand not all extreme cases of lack of 
self-restraint or vulgarity constitute obscenity. Consider the following cases of extreme vulgarity: it is rumored 
that Robert Maxwell once held a lavish dinner party to celebrate something like his ruby wedding anniversary, 
where every single dish was called after or involved some reference to himself; someone boasting loudly in a 
restaurant about the huge amount of money she earns; someone boasting about his sex life or making 
innuendoes about the sex lives of others at a party to people he is hardly acquainted with; someone deliberately 
seeking to show up or embarrass people; being over familiar with others; constant swearing; eating noisily at a 
restaurant table without using cutlery. All these cases violate norms of behavior and character in ways that seem 
to manifest an unrefined, coarseness of mind and lack of appropriate self-restraint. But though they are indeed 
instances of extreme vulgarity we are not tempted to consider them obscene per se. On the other hand, pace 
Feinberg, not all obscenity belies or is concomitant with vulgarity. The mode in which an obscene insult is 
expressed, for example, can be of a highly restrained, refined, elegant and sophisticated kind. Similarly artworks 
may commend to us an obscene thought or attitude but do so in a subtle, nuanced, restrained and sophisticated 
manner. Katsushika Hokusai’s wood block print Awabi Fisherwoman and Octopus is ferociously explicit in its 
representation of sex between a woman and an octopus. As such one might be tempted to call it obscene, but 
certainly not vulgar. The point is that obscenity can be artfully conveyed in a manner that marks out a 
discriminating, refined though possibly morally decadent mind. This suggests that obscenity quintessentially 
has a certain moral rather than charientic character. Even were Feinberg to advert to the weaker thesis that the 
obscene supervenes on the charientic a/ this is insufficient to deprive obscenity of its inherent moral character 
given one might hold that the moral character of any action or representation must admit of supervenience 
relations and b/ one has reason to doubt that obscenity supervenes on the charientic given that the same 
photograph of a naked child may be judged obscene or perfectly innocent depending upon changes external to 
the content of the photograph, for example whether it is exhibited innocently in a family photograph album or 
placed on a pedophile’s web site.  
 Furthermore, in cases where we do judge vulgarity to be obscene the kinds of appraisals we make are 
not wholly specifiable without appeal to some notion of moral violation. To condemn a representation, which 
solicits an interest in the death throes of people being executed, or which glorifies the rape of women as obscene 
is, amongst other things, already to incorporate the judgment that to laugh at or delight in such things is deeply 
immoral. Even in cases of bad manners where we judge the vulgarity displayed to be obscene, this is so only 
where some moral norm is contravened. Consider the Monty Python Mr. Creosote sketch in The Meaning of 
Life. Mr. Creosote is a large diner in a very smart, busy restaurant. He begins to eat in the most wretched, 
disgusting, atavistic manner, growing ever more obese as he consumes larger and larger amounts of food. 
Towards the end he vomits sporadically into the champagne bucket especially brought for this purpose until he 
is finally sated - only to be tempted by the wafer thin mint (whereupon, having eaten it, he finally explodes). 
Now, if someone were to behave similarly (explosion aside) we would likely judge his or her behavior obscene. 
But this would not merely be because in so doing certain charientic norms of etiquette are violated in the most 
extreme manner possible. What exactly renders such behavior obscene is not yet obvious.  But, at the very least, 
two elements seem relevant. Firstly, the nature of the diner's behavior is disgusting and repulsive. But this alone 
cannot be sufficient since not all things that are disgusting and repulsive are obscene. Secondly, that his 
behavior manifests extreme greed and thus involves the violation of a moral norm. It is only because the lack of 
self-restraint of the diner abrogates a moral norm of character in this manner that we are inclined to judge his 
actions obscene. 
 Thus, pace Feinberg, obscenity cannot be an extreme case or mere sub-species of vulgarity. Obscenity 
is in principle distinct from vulgarity - not all cases of obscenity constitutively involve vulgarity, although 
vulgarity may often be obscene. So we still need criteria that would enable us to sort out when and where 
something is merely vulgar and where something is obscene - which is much worse. 
 Discussions of obscenity most frequently arise in relation to pornography and sexual matters. Here the 
standard characterization of obscenity is given in terms of the notion of objectification. So it might be thought 
that a characterization of obscenity as constitutively involving objectification would likely prove adequate. For 
objectification is often held to abrogate respect for persons, hence the account would recognize that obscenity 
constitutively involves the violation of a moral norm, and can be extended to include many actions or 
representations which do not involve sex but nonetheless are commonly regarded as obscene, from slavery and 
torture to certain kinds of representations of death and disease. The core thought is that objectification 
dehumanizes persons by representing them as mere objects, things, or commodities. However, as Martha 
Nussbaum has argued, the notion of objectification is a multiply variegated concept involving at least the 
following notions: instrumentality; denial of autonomy; inertness; fungibility; violability; ownership; denial of 
subjectivity. Furthermore, certain kinds of sexual objectification can be a wonderful, non-objectionable part of 
sexual life as long as instrumentalisation is absent, the objectification is mutual and occurs within a context of 
mutual respect. Hence Nussbaum contrasts the objectification represented in Lawrence’s Lady Chatterly’s 
Lover with that present in crude pornography. So obscenity, which is always a strongly negative evaluative 
term, cannot be straightforwardly identified with objectification per se. Rather, it may be thought, it must be 
related to a particular kind of objectification. 
 Nussbaum herself, though she never discusses obscenity, marks out the most vicious kind of 
objectification as involving the preclusion of a person’s subjectivity and autonomy. Pornography objectifies in 
just this way by presenting women as objects who are substitutable, subject to the control and desire of the 
reader and whose experiences matter not at all. This view ties in neatly with Roger Scruton’s notion of 
objectification, which is explicitly linked to the notion of obscenity. For Scruton obscenity consists in 
objectifying another person through conceiving of the embodied person as reducible to their mere body thereby 
precluding their first person perspective. 
 Following this line of thought we can extract the following characterization of obscenity. Obscenity 
abrogates the fundamental moral norm of respect for persons in virtue of denying or precluding their first 
person perspective. What it is for something to be obscene is to manifest, solicit or endorse this kind of 
objectification. However, although suggestive, such a characterization remains inadequate because the notion of 
objectification cannot do the work required. There are several strong reasons that suggest not only that this is a 
mischaracterization of much pornography but also that we should be reluctant to identify obscenity with this 
particular kind of objectifying interest in others. 
 Firstly, there are many cases of taking an interest in something that preclude the first person 
perspective of the subject involved which are not obviously obscene at all. Consider representations of the 
chivalric ideal. A woman is represented as an object to be possessed and her autonomy and subjectivity, except 
in relation to the aspiring male’s desire, is precluded. Similarly, in many Pre-Raphaelite paintings any sense of 
the depicted woman’s particular first person perspective is precluded. Still, in these cases the preclusion of the 
first person perspective is not concomitant with a focused attention on the body parts of the subjects involved. 
But consider Lucian Freud’s explicit nudes which often entirely preclude the subject’s self-consciousness, 
concentrates viewers attention on the subject’s body parts and thereby solicit an objectifying interest in them - 
yet we would not want to consider them obscene. His series of Leigh Bowrey, for example, draws attention to 
the mottled tones, contours and sheer expanse of flesh. In several of them only Bowrey’s expansive back and 
the top of his domed head is visible to us. Our attention is solicited with respect only to the corporeal nature of 
his body and yet we would not be tempted to call the paintings obscene. So not all cases of the kind of interest 
picked out as obscene seem to be instances of an obscene interest. 
 Secondly, the preclusion of another’s first person perspective seems to mark out a depersonalized 
interest in them. So the presumption is that we are disinterested, at least qua person, in whomever we take an 
obscene interest in. Yet an obscene interest in others, at least in certain cases, seems to be an essentially 
interested, personal one, albeit of a possibly perverted kind. Far from being disinterested we are often 
essentially interested in another as a person in some way. 
 Objectification, especially where it is construed in terms of reducibility to body parts, cannot 
adequately capture how pornographic representations seek to engage the viewer’s interest. Consider the way 
strippers must work in order to elicit an obscene interest in them. The audience is not straightaway presented 
with the nude body. Rather the stripper must present herself in some semblance of an ordinary person and, in 
ritualized fashion, gradually strip away the various layers of clothing until the moment of complete revelation. 
This is not merely a fancy way of drawing the process out so observers feel like they are getting their money’s 
worth but reflects something quite deep about what it is to take up an objectifying interest in someone. The 
stripper presents herself in a certain guise, often but not always making use of the clothing, paraphernalia and 
associations of certain stock roles. In so doing she enables the audience to make-believe with minimal 
imaginative effort that, fictionally, they are looking at a particular individual who has a certain role, character 
and dispositions. This is crucial in order to be interested in the (fictional) character as a person. Furthermore the 
stripper must comport herself in a manner which suggests that, fictionally, her character is available and open to 
the sexual desire and interest of those in the audience. Once this has been established she can then gradually 
strip away her layers in a ritualized, stepped fashion. In doing so she increasingly draws attention to her sexual 
features and simulates sexual arousal. Thus the individual in the audience is prescribed to imagine that, 
fictionally, she is available, aroused and, in her state of sexual desire, open to being satiated by his sexual desire 
for her. If the stripper were to start straight away without any clothes and just walk on it would be harder to take 
an obscene interest in her. For in that case it would be easier to see her just as a body or piece of meat which we 
might take a depersonalized interest in but certainly not an interest which is found to be arousing - and that is 
the point of the exercise. Indeed, certain paradigmatically obscene sexual representations concentrate on the 
first person perspective of those one is prescribed to take an obscene interest in. Hard-core pornographic novels 
and movies often prescribe attention to how the characters represented are, what they putatively desire, believe 
and feel in seeking to elicit sexual arousal from the audience. 
 Of course, it could be objected that the actual responses of arousal and desire on the part of the 
audience are fixed on a substitutable person who is used as a prop for us to imagine a fictional object - it is, in 
essence, fantastical. True, for the fantasy and the obscene interest in the stripper to be sustained the audience 
must conceive of the stripper as a person. But we are not interested in the person she actually is, and her actual 
first person perspective, but that of the fictional character her act prescribes us to make-believe about. But 
whether the object of our interest here is fictional or not is beside the point. Were it the case that the stripper or 
person in a pornographic home movie were in fact as she presented herself to be and was aroused as she 
represented herself to be, the interest in her would still be thought to be obscene. Pornography generally, 
especially photography, represents actual women and may stimulate a desire for the actual woman which sex 
with someone else would not satisfy. Moreover, the typical case involves being interested in the experiences 
and responses of the person represented (whether fictional or actual), for example that they want sex. It is a 
general fact about sexual activity and interest that indulging it with someone who is not enjoying it is not, at 
least for most people, sexually satisfying. Peeping Tom type characters, who take a sexual interest of this kind 
in others, are often interested specifically in who the actual person is - no other person would do - and their 
particular mental states. 
It might be pointed out that at least most people would not consider stripping per se and the interest 
solicited in it obscene. But this only serves to highlight further the inadequacy of the account of obscenity 
proffered. Furthermore, the specific points made about the personalized interest solicited still go through in 
relation to more obviously paradigmatic instances of obscenity – in the case of extremely violent pornography 
say. We can even imagine a representation of a rape where the viewer’s interest is solicited with respect to what 
the victim’s actual first person states are and, moreover, that it is crucial to the perpetrator as represented that it 
is the particular person it is whom they are raping. The interest of the perpetrator is excited by it being this 
particular person, that this particular victim feels angry, powerless, sexually subjugated and abused. Here it 
matters that the victim is the particular person they are, that their first person responses to their violation are 
what is being attended to by the perpetrator of this heinous act and that this is what the audience’s interest is 
being directed toward. Nor is this confined to cases concerned with sexual interest. A few years ago a video was 
released in the U.K. that consisted of footage from capital punishment executions of criminals in the U.S.A. The 
video was condemned as obscene by virtue of soliciting an interest in the pain, suffering and death throes of the 
criminals. But far from precluding the first person perspective of the person being executed the video solicits 
the viewer to contemplate and savor the anticipation, dread, pain, fear and death throes of the particular people 
being put to death. Hence we are prescribed not just to recognize that they are self-conscious, but the particular 
person they are and their particular responses to what they are being subjected to. Such cases are far from rare. 
If one goes into a large newsagent one will often find magazines with titles such as Murder Monthly which 
detail salaciously the more gruesome aspects of serial killings or infamous crimes. In their detailing of the 
crimes such magazines focus readers attention on and prescribe responses toward not just how the victim was 
killed but how they might or must have felt. 
 So far from precluding and being disinterested in the first person perspective of another, at least certain 
kinds of interests we would characterize as obscene essentially presuppose an interest of a personal kind in 
another’s fictional or actual first person states. A depersonalized interest in others that apprehends them not as 
persons but in a detached fashion as objects constituted by their bodily nature may in various contexts be deeply 
problematic. But this cannot be an adequate characterization of just what it is for an interest in someone to be 
obscene. There are paradigmatic cases of obscene interest in the actions of others or representations which far 
from precluding the first person perspective of another actively solicit and indulge in the contemplation of it. It 
might be added that there are also many things we would deem obscene which do not obviously involve 
personal relationships in any way. 
 To claim that obscenity consists in a certain kind of objectification is to conflate a typical means of 
realizing obscenity with obscenity itself. For there are paradigmatic instances of obscenity that do not involve 
such objectification at all, and, conversely, not all cases which involve the mode of objectification identified are 
obscene. We tend to judge a whole range of features, representations, attitudes and interests as obscene and we 
are left without any informative account of obscenity as such which is supposed to bring them all together. 
 
III: Paradigmatic Judgments of Obscenity 
In striving for an adequate characterization of obscenity it is helpful to bear in mind paradigmatic examples of 
what we are seeking to define. So the best place to start is with a list of examples and kinds of cases that are 
standardly judged to be obscene. There are a wide diversity of interests, actions and representations often 
judged to be obscene and many instances are highly contentious. It should also be noted that one can have 
obscene representations of non-obscene actions and, conversely, representations of obscene actions that are not 
themselves obscene – a representation of a gruesome rape may not be obscene whilst a representation of 
consensual, straightforward sex between married partners may be. Moreover, the context of an action or 
representation may well make a crucial difference. Although I am not claiming that the following list is 
exhaustive or complete, I am claiming that they are paradigmatic cases of judgments of obscenity. The 
methodological assumption is that once we get an informative account of the nature and structure of judgments 
of obscenity in the central cases, we should be able to see when, where and why a judgment of obscenity may 
(or may not) be made appropriately in more contentious borderline cases. Furthermore it is crucial to recognize 
that in judging something to be obscene the target of the judgment is the attitudes and interests as manifested in 
an action or representation. When we talk of a photograph or film being obscene, for example, it is the attitude 
of the implied author as conveyed through the photograph or film toward which the judgment is directed. Hence 
we distinguish between medical textbook photographs taken and displayed with the more exalted aim of 
informing students about clinical diagnosis and perceptually indiscernible photographs taken and displayed for 
the purposes of savoring and delighting in the repulsive appearances of disease and deformity. The most 
unproblematic judgments of obscenity arising from paradigmatic instances come under the following kinds of 
cases, where 1-4 are a non-exhaustive list of alternative necessary but not sufficient conditions: 
 
1. An action or event is represented in such a way as to solicit and commend cognitive-affective responses of 
sexual desire that are taken to be morally prohibited. 
 
This covers such cases as extremely hard-core pornography where, amongst other things, rape, necrophilia, 
pedophilia or brutally violent and intrusive sexual activities are represented as sexually arousing and desirable. 
The representation aims to solicit such arousal and desire in its audience and commends such responses to us by 
prescribing us to delight in them. Thus, for example, we distinguish between De Sadean works like Juliette, 
hard-core pornography or films such as Peter Greenaway’s The Baby of Macon where the audience is prescribed 
to delight in the sexual subjugation and pain of a rape victim and the arousal of the perpetrators of rape from 
portrayals of rape as represented to us in works such as Jonathan Demme’s The Accused. Although The Accused 
portrays a rape both from the perpetrators and victim’s viewpoint we are not prescribed to delight in the sexual 
arousal of the perpetrators or the subjugation of the victim. The Accused is not obscene since far from 
commending such desires to us, as Juliette does, such responses are condemned. The distinctive characteristic 
of this kind of obscenity is that the purpose of the representation is to solicit and commend as delightful morally 
prohibited sexual desires. 
 2. Judgements of obscenity need not and often are not directed toward soliciting and commending sexual 
desires taken to be morally prohibited. They are often directed toward actions and representations that aim to 
solicit and commend morally prohibited cognitive-affective responses to the infliction of pain, suffering, 
misfortune and even the death of persons. 
 
This covers classic cases of extreme representations of violence. It also covers cases such as the death row 
video whose purpose is directed toward soliciting an interest in the pain, suffering and death throes of the 
criminal, a different video released by the same company consisting of repeated footage of slowed down scenes 
of airplane crashes and crime magazines such as Murder Monthly where the audience is prescribed to savor or 
delight in the physical pain, fear, suffering and even death of those represented. Such cases are distinct from 
non-obscene representations which may involve exactly the same subject matter - such as a somber video on 
capital punishment by Amnesty International, a video on air crashes by the air traffic authority and police 
reports of murders. In the latter cases though our attention may be directed toward the same features of the 
objects of the representations, we are not prescribed by the way in which it is done to savor the suffering 
involved. 
 It also covers cases that do not involve violence but where one is nonetheless prescribed to pruriently 
enjoy or delight in the misfortunes of others. Freak shows, certain kinds of jokes (about the Holocaust say) or 
novels that prescribe a delight in the tragic nature of someone’s misfortune are often judged obscene on this 
basis although no violence is involved. Hence we distinguish between obscene freak show type cases, where we 
are prescribed to look upon and delight in the deformed as sub-human, and the merely grotesque, such as 
competitors in a gurning competition, where the object of fascination and delight is the appearance of facial 
contortions alone. In the former case people are represented as being freakishly other than human and this is 
what our responses are shaped toward and prescribed to pruriently enjoy or delight in. We also distinguish 
between tragedies proper, such as Othello, and cases of obscenity where we are prescribed to delight in 
suffering. Similarly we distinguish between the merely horrific and the obscene where the former is an 
appropriate object of fear but need not be represented as attractive or, where it is, the responses themselves (of 
horror) are not morally prohibited. 
 
3. Judgments of obscenity are also often made with respect to objects whose authorized purpose is not directed 
toward soliciting and commending morally prohibited cognitive-affective responses. However, the context in 
which they are displayed or the use to which they are put may render them obscene. No-one, for example, 
would consider children’s clothing catalogues to be obscene per se. But where photographs culled from such 
catalogues are grouped together on a pedophilia collage or web-site they may become so. For they are being 
grouped together to draw attention to ways in which they may be viewed as arousing morally prohibited 
cognitive-affective responses - in this case sexual desire directed toward pre-pubescents. The same may be true 
of medical photographs of diseased bodies or cadavers. The individual photographs are not obscene in any way 
but a collage of such photographs may be arranged in a way which prescribes the viewer to respond with delight 
to the pain, suffering or death represented. Here it is the purposive context rather than the authorized purpose 
for which the photographs were taken which guides our responses in a way that gives rise to the judgment of 
obscenity. 
 
4. Lastly there are objects or actions which do not purposively authorize or attempt to commend cognitive-
affective responses which are morally prohibited and yet which are commonly judged obscene where they 
naturally give rise to such responses i.e. they naturally elicit rather than purposively solicit them. For example, 
multiple couples having sex in public or the macabre debris of a fatal car accident may result in similar 
responses to that intended or which is the purpose of those objects characterized in groups 1 and 2. The 
intention or purpose, with respect to the authorized purpose of the objects themselves or their setting in context, 
may be entirely absent. Consider the case of a somewhat gross sex orgy in the park as witnessed by passers by. 
Many will judge the act to be morally prohibited, at least on the minimal grounds that sex (morally) should be 
an essentially private matter. Thus to look at the couple, whether out of curiosity or because the scene is found 
to be sexually arousing, is itself deemed to be morally prohibited. Nonetheless, it is a natural response to be 
tempted to glance and at least cop a good look precisely because the scene is fascinating or arousing. The 
intention of those taking part in the orgy may be in no way to solicit such responses - perhaps they chose that 
part of the park on the mistaken assumption that no-one ever walked there - nonetheless their actions naturally 
give rise to responses which underwrite the judgment of obscenity. 
 
The paradigmatic kinds of obscenity manifest a variety of features which are marks of the obscene: subject 
matter of bodily functions, sex, violence and death; certain kinds of interest taken up in such subject matter; a 
lack of self-restraint being sought or elicited in the audience or viewer; treating persons as objects; public 
indecency. Whilst it is right to take such features as potential markers, none of them capture obscenity’s 
fundamental character. With respect to representations it is crucial to bear in mind that it is not the predominant 
subject matter per se of obscenity, sex, death and violence, which give rise to the judgement of obscenity. 
Rather, in the case of representations, obscenity concerns the ways in which such subject matter is treated in 
order to solicit or elicit certain kinds of responses from us. Moreover it cannot be that a judgement of obscenity 
is applied to anything and everything that we cognitively-affectively respond to as being morally prohibited. 
Otherwise obscenity would be reduced merely to that which is deemed morally very bad. But there are many 
things that may be judged morally prohibited, from the betrayal of a friend or adultery to a representation 
glorifying the brutalities of imperialism, without giving rise to a judgment of obscenity. 
 
IV: The Phenomenology of the Obscene 
A rough characterization of the paradigmatic cases of judgments of obscenity must give due recognition to a 
central feature of the phenomenology involved in all four kinds of cases - namely the feelings of repulsion, by 
virtue of soliciting or naturally eliciting fascination in responses taken to be morally prohibited, and attraction 
toward indulging or even delighting in those very responses.  
 But by virtue of what is one being attracted to indulge cognitive-affective responses taken to be 
morally proscribed and which give rise to feelings of repulsion? Another way of asking the same question is to 
ask what motivating reason or purpose could one have for indulging in that which is taken to be morally 
repulsive? There are three distinct reasons or purposes that explain the attraction involved: 
 
1. Desire Fulfillment 
The paradigmatic cases of obscenity all involved the solicitation or natural elicitation of cognitive-affective 
responses toward the object taken to be morally prohibited. That they shape or naturally give rise to such 
responses explains our repulsion but, given the attraction involved, points towards the indulgence of motivating 
desires - which do not arise in response to what is taken to be morally permissible, right or good but are taken to 
be contrary to fundamental moral prohibitions. 
 Take, for example, a representation of a rape where one is directed toward delighting and being 
aroused by the victim’s pain, powerlessness and sexual subjugation. It is found to be repulsive because it 
commends us to delight in responses arising from what makes rape the deeply immoral and heinous act it is. 
Nonetheless, at least in so far as the representation is successful, it also evokes a sense of sexual excitement, 
arousal and desire. For such a representation seeks to create or speak to a desire for sexual power, domination 
and supremacy against another’s will on the one hand and, on the other, the desire to be sexually subjugated by 
the will of another. Such desires, and thus attraction toward these kinds of representations, are not uncommon 
amongst both men and women though they are also taken to be morally prohibited with respect to their being 
manifested in actions such as rape. Such a representation is thus both repulsive, by virtue of being morally 
abhorrent, and attractive, by virtue of arousing and commending certain basic sexual desires. 
 The very same kind of characterization is appropriate with respect to many representations of violence, 
suffering, death or misfortune adjudged obscene though the relevant desires being indulged may be rather 
different. But the desires are common enough - to see or make another suffer, to exercise power by subjugating 
the will of another or to victimize. Were one to be given the opportunity to actually carry out such desires with 
respect to real people the morally decent person would not act on them, would feel overwhelmingly repulsed 
and feel no attraction at the prospect of so doing. But with respect to objects that speak to such desires without 
involving acting upon and harming others, the force of the moral prohibition slackens somewhat and one feels 
the pull of the desires spoken to (at least where the object is successful). 
 It is important to note that the desires as indulged in the cognitive-affective responses may be taken to 
be morally prohibited for 3 distinct reasons: 
 
i/ The desires may be held to be intrinsically bad – such as the desire to entirely subjugate another in raping, 
torturing or killing. 
 
ii/ The desires themselves may not be held to be intrinsically bad but misdirected in morally prohibited ways. 
For example, the desire to be sexually dominant or dominated is not of itself obviously intrinsically bad. But as 
aroused and indulged in the representation of rape such a desire may be taken to be misdirected in a morally 
prohibited manner. 
 
iii/ The desires may not be taken to be intrinsically bad or misdirected but a surfeit of indulgence of a desire 
may be taken to be morally prohibited. For example, the indulgence of a desire for food is not intrinsically bad 
and as directed toward a desire to eat meat one may not hold it to be morally inappropriate. But sating this 
appetite through overindulgence in one sitting by eating plateful after plateful of racks of ribs followed by 
numerous pigs’ trotters may be judged obscene. For eating a gross amount of ribs and trotters manifests extreme 
greed that is taken to be morally prohibited. 
 
2. Meta-Desire Fulfillment 
It may well be that some of the paradigmatic cases of obscenity though adjudged to be morally repulsive, by 
virtue of soliciting and commending morally prohibited cognitive-affective responses, are not found to be 
attractive in virtue of the first order morally prohibited desires they speak to. Nonetheless, they may still be 
adjudged obscene due to the attraction involved at the second order level - that the representation solicits and 
commends morally prohibited responses is what is found attractive and delighted in even though the first order 
desires themselves are not. 
 Consider, for example, a narrative where the central character is represented as progressing from the 
violation of one moral taboo after another - say committing incest in chapter 1, necrophilia in chapter 2, torture 
in chapter 3 and so on. It does not seek to solicit arousal and commend to us the particular desires that such acts 
may speak to. Indeed the scenes of moral violation are portrayed in a disinterested, detached manner precisely 
to avoid evoking in the reader a sense of excitement, arousal and desire with respect to them. However, what the 
narrative does do is to solicit and commend to us, as exciting, interesting and delightful, moral transgression as 
such. This meta-response the narrative seeks to evoke, delight at the transgression of moral norms, speaks to a 
common desire to break free from the fundamental moral norms and mores we ordinarily take to be binding. 
We are not attracted to do so in everyday life because of the high moral costs to oneself (the concomitant 
feelings of shame and guilt) and others (the harm they would suffer) of doing a grave wrong and the high 
prudential costs (being ostracized by others at best or imprisoned at worst). But such costs are far less with 
respect to representations that merely solicit, indulge and commend a desire to be morally transgressive without 
any obvious harm to anyone. Hence one may feel the pull of such objects much more easily. Thus we may 
judge such cases obscene by virtue of the moral repulsion, at both the acts represented and the commendation of 
moral transgression, and yet simultaneously attractive, by virtue of indulging our desire to be morally 
transgressive and freed from the constraining shackles of moral norms and prohibitions. 
 The meta-response found attractive need not be the second-order desire to be morally transgressive. It 
may just be a desire to delight in the first order feelings of repulsion that the object affords. One may grant that 
there are certain ideal human standards by virtue of which it is appropriate to derive pleasure from certain things 
and be repelled by others. Certain tastes or sensations are pleasurable under certain standard and normative 
human conditions. However, in secondary cases, where we can inhibit or modify the standard conditions 
through interference or convention, then the feelings of repulsion which are typically unpleasant may be found, 
by some at least, to be pleasurable. Hence representations of murder which are repulsive and which salaciously 
celebrate the pain and torture involved may be found attractive by virtue of the feelings of repulsion which 
arise, even though were one presented with the case as represented in real life one would not feel pleasure at all 
but only intense aversion. Not all objects that speak to this delight in being repulsed will be appropriate objects 
of the judgment of obscenity. For many of them will be merely ugly, grotesque or horrific. Nonetheless, where 
this motivation is spoken to by an object that seeks to solicit responses we morally ought not to indulge or 
desire, then it is a paradigmatic case of obscenity. 
 A little bit more does need to be said here about how feelings of repulsion may be found – by some, 
under some conditions – to be pleasurable. It may be thought that the very notion of ‘delight in being repulsed’ 
is oxymoronic. One way of disambiguating the notion is in terms of delight in the fact that one is repulsed by an 
object. On this reading we do not delight in the feelings of repulsion as such but, rather, we delight in the fact 
that we have an unpleasant response of repulsion to the object concerned. This is a mark of our being the sort of 
person who responds negatively to the kinds of things that violate moral taboos. Thus the pleasure or delight is 
explained as a function of the recognition that we are morally decent people who decry the violation of what is 
taken to be morally sacred. Such a reading looks relatively unproblematic, given that it does not involve the 
claim that we somehow enjoy repulsion as such which is intrinsically unpleasant, and does seem to fit certain 
kinds of cases. Consider, for example, Céline’s Voyage au bout de la nuit. The nihilistic, morally transgressive 
and repulsive character of the novel is, in part at least, directed toward a vehement protest against the 
meaninglessness of modern existence. The moral disgust and repulsion the novel solicits from the reader is thus 
represented as unbearably awful and the pleasure sought from the reader is, at least in part, the pleasure of 
recognition – namely that one is the kind of person who is morally repulsed by the states of affairs as 
represented. 
However, this cannot be the whole story. For many obscene works which solicit repulsion, by virtue of 
soliciting or naturally eliciting fascination in responses taken to be morally prohibited, and attraction toward 
indulging or even delighting in those very responses, cannot be said to have the purpose of reminding us that we 
are morally decent people and thereby afford us pleasure in this recognition. Rather what they seek to do is 
elicit pleasure in the very feelings of repulsion or disgust that are solicited – the work of Antonin Artaud, John 
Waters, de Sade, the Earl of Rochester or Georges Bataille stands testimony to this being the case. Consider 
Patrick who read a novel on the recommendation of a friend that it is really obscene. But Patrick finds he reacts 
only with mild distaste to the novel and complains bitterly to his friend on the grounds that the book just wasn’t 
repulsive enough. His friend responds by suggesting that Patrick wasn’t responding with the appropriate level of 
moral disapprobation which would have afforded him the pleasure of recognizing himself to be a morally 
decent person. But no, Patrick retorts, to be sure the events represented were morally bad enough for him to be 
afforded that pleasure – it’s just that it wasn’t repulsive. What Patrick was seeking was the enjoyment afforded 
by experiencing repulsion. 
At first pass this looks paradoxical – since how could someone enjoy experiencing a negative feeling 
or emotion? But the paradox can be dissolved if we consider a solution articulated by Berys Gaut in relation to 
the paradox of horror. To be repulsed by something involves not only certain affective feelings but a negative 
evaluation. Different cognitive-affective states are to be individuated not merely in terms of their 
phenomenological aspect, since different cognitive-affective states may share the same phenomenology, but in 
terms of their evaluative thoughts. What distinguishes a positive from a negative cognitive-affective state 
concerns the evaluations involved. The object to which a state is directed is brought under negative evaluative 
concepts: the disgusting, the repulsive, the shameful and so on. Importantly this does not sever the conceptual 
link between evaluation and pleasure. Rather it is necessarily typically the case that if someone positively 
evaluates a state of affairs then he will find that state of affairs pleasant. But, as I suggested above, this allows 
for atypical cases where the typically unpleasant feelings of repulsion are found, by some at least, to be 
pleasurable. 
 
3. Cognitive Rewards 
Often the motivating attraction in paradigmatic judgments of obscenity does not arise from particular morally 
prohibited desires or the desire to be morally transgressive. However, the judgment may still arise by virtue of 
the abrogation of moral prohibitions against conceiving, representing or treating persons in certain ways, which 
gives rise to repulsion, and yet found to be attractive or compelling in virtue of the cognitive interests spoken to 
- such as curiosity or fascination. 
 Consider the case of Leontion in Plato’s Republic. Leontion, amidst the debris of execution, struggles 
with himself because he both feels compelled to dwell on the appearance of the mutilated corpses and yet feels 
repulsed because he takes it that so doing violates the kinds of interests one should have or take in the dead. The 
attraction does not arise because Leontion wishes to dwell on and delight in the physical violence, pain and 
suffering that caused the corpses mutilation. Nor does the element of compulsion arise because he has a desire 
to be morally transgressive as such. Rather he is attracted to dwelling on the gruesome sight out of sheer 
curiosity and fascination with what mutilated corpses look like. This is not uncommon - it is a familiar feature 
of motorway driving that hold ups are often the result of motorists slowing down to take a lingering glance at 
the wreckage of car crashes and crowds often gather at scenes of accidents, suicide attempts and shoot outs to 
peer at the wounded or dead. 
 It should be noted that an interesting case of fascination where something is adjudged obscene may be 
due, oddly enough, to the sheer disbelief or incredulity at the extent of the moral abrogation involved or the way 
in which the moral norms are abrogated. The repulsion arises from the object commending the indulgence of 
desires taken to be morally prohibited but the attraction arises as an expression of the internal commitment to 
the moral norms so shockingly abrogated. 
 For example, a few years ago an exhibition of a contemporary artist’s work in London included a 
figurative work where a fetus was used to represent an earring as an integral part of the piece. A friend of mine 
just could not believe that the artist had done this and was fundamentally outraged at what she took to be deeply 
immoral (she suggested it was akin to the use of murdered corpses in a work). But it was not just that she was 
morally offended or outraged. For, despite her repulsion, she felt compelled to go back to the piece again and 
again. Indeed, the rest of the exhibition seemed to hold relatively little interest for her compared to this piece. It 
was not that she was curious about or fascinated with the appearance of the fetus as such. Rather she was just 
incredulous that the artist had used the fetus in this manner at all given her deep moral conviction that abortion 
amounted to murder. The motivating attraction of the piece just was its abrogation of what she took to be a 
fundamental moral prohibition. Thus the judgment of obscenity was expressive of her deep moral convictions. 
 
V: Worries 
Having characterized the motivational reasons which explain the attraction to that adjudged morally prohibited 
something remains to be said about the element of repulsion. Thus far a proper judgment of obscenity has been 
characterized in terms of something that is both found attractive for the reasons adjudged and held to be morally 
prohibited. But this cannot be sufficient. Consider The Simpsons. Bart is often represented as doing and 
delighting in various immoral if usually minor acts. The audience is prescribed to respond with enjoyment and 
delight at these activities. As it happens the context of the program as a whole is if anything rather moral - Bart 
is basically a naturally mischievous but fundamentally decent character. Nonetheless, one can imagine a rather 
puritanical parent judging the program to be morally pernicious because of the solicited delight in what are held 
to be immoral activities. But this is not to judge the program to be obscene. After all, many acts and 
representations we deem to be morally prohibited are nonetheless found attractive for the reasons adduced, from 
lying and adultery to scurrilous autobiographies, yet we would not call them, as such, obscene. 
The worry is an important one and points us toward what is lacking thus far in our characterization of a 
judgment of obscenity - the element of repulsion. Consider the range of phenomena that tend to be involved in 
paradigmatic cases of obscenity and the ways in which, in representations at least, we are prescribed to attend to 
them. Our attention is drawn to the texture, color and dimensions of body parts, the soft, malleable, yielding 
nature of flesh, the flecked, glistening, oozing nature of bodily fluids and the hard-bodied, tensile, well-defined 
nature of bone amongst other things. The standard case concerns the visual appearance of an object, though it 
can and sometimes is a matter of the sound, smell, or touch of an object which is found to be repulsive - the 
look of a diseased body, the sound of screams of pain or smells of putrefaction for example. The repulsion 
involved tends to arise from the visceral nature of that being adjudged obscene. 
 What is found to be repulsive will be individually and socio-culturally relative to a high degree. For 
example, a vegan may well be repulsed when seeing anyone eating meat since she attends to it in terms of the 
ripping flesh, bloody juices and white bone of a creature that should not have been killed or be eaten whereas, 
for many meat eaters at least, this is not how they would naturally attend and respond to such a sight at all. 
However it is easy to imagine ways in which a film maker could represent someone eating meat so as to solicit 
repulsion in ordinary meat eaters. A diner might be filmed eating a grotesquely outsized pig’s trotter, the 
camera might focus on the sheen of the juices coating the crackling, the flecked spittle of the diner, the gape of 
the mouth as the pink flesh is brought up to be engorged. Indeed, where the diner is represented as gorging 
himself on a surfeit of meat, and the extreme satiation of such a desire is considered morally bad, then we might 
naturally and properly judge the scene as represented to be obscene. That a film maker could shape ordinary 
meat eaters responses in this way suggests that, despite a high degree of relativity regarding what is found to be 
repulsive, there are certain kinds of things that we are naturally repulsed by qua human beings. Certainly certain 
kinds of smells or sights such as maggot ridden, putrefying bodies, people eating their own faeces and vomit or 
the torturous infliction of extreme pain would be found universally repulsive. It is far from unlikely that such 
basic common responses are hardwired at the biological level for adaptive evolutionary reasons, though how the 
fundamental biological underpinning to many of our aversive reactions is expressed is culturally variant. 
Aversive reactions to things which smell, sound or look repulsive manifests a life preserving urge since such 
things are, more often than not, the marks of disease, contamination, hostility or danger. 
 A different kind of worry brings us back to the question of how useful it is to talk of obscenity at all. 
The term’s function, in terms of its modern history at least, may be thought of as an upshot of the two basic 
senses it seems to have had: i/ disgusting or repulsive to the senses (which has little if anything to do with 
morality) and ii/ positively indecent or immoral. The latter sense was taken up into and formalized by Anglo-
American law and was utilized within the legal framework to pick out certain grounds for censorship and 
prohibition. But, at least from the 1960’s on, the term has acquired very different connotations. For example, it 
became de rigueur to assert claims such as ‘war is obscene’, ‘capitalism is obscene’, ‘environmental 
degradation is obscene’, ‘first world exploitation of the third world is obscene’ and so on. Not only are such 
uses of the term obscenity inconsistent with the account given but the very process of using the term in such 
ways for the purposes of moral rhetoric has, in fact, meant that it has come to lose any precise meaning it once 
had. It is rather futile to give a conceptual analysis of a moral term when its sense has evolved away from that 
which the analysis seeks to capture because the social institutions, outlooks and attitudes which made sense of 
the use characterized have dwindled away. It would be rather like trying to give an analysis of  ‘gay’ in terms of 
its use and function in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as if it applied in any informative fashion to 
our use of the term now. 
 The point should be well taken. However, the argument I have given is not a case of conceptual 
analysis in the sense that I am merely seeking to capture the socio-cultural meanings and uses of the term. 
Rather I have sought to show that there are a certain set of complex responses giving rise to a distinctive kind of 
judgment that constitutes a complex moral phenomenon. Moreover, the phenomenon does have, for the reasons 
given, striking similarities to the kinds of things people often try to get at or articulate when they condemn a 
representation or action as obscene. Of course, the account does not straightforwardly map onto all the uses of 
the term precisely for the reasons given. But, the point is, the account picks out precisely what people are trying 
to get at in some cases of what are taken to be paradigmatic instances of obscenity. For these reasons I take it to 
be appropriate as a normative account of obscenity. If the term is to be used in any interesting sense, then it 
must be the sense given by the account I have characterized. Still, if others wish to use some other new term for 
the complex responses and phenomenon I have mapped out then the issue is a semantic one. But I have at least 
good reason for my semantic preference - the account does pick out a distinctive phenomenological character 
which explains the complex nature of our affective responses to many things taken to be paradigmatically 
obscene and explains why, independently of causal considerations, some people may think certain kinds of 
things adjudged obscene should be prohibited. 
 
 VI: The Formalized Account of Judgments of Obscenity 
An examination of the phenomenology of judgments of obscenity provides the basis for an adequate 
characterization. For an agent to properly judge something to be obscene the object of her judgment must 
naturally elicit or commendingly solicit cognitive-affective responses that abrogate her internalized moral 
prohibitions. Furthermore the object must do so in a way that gives rise to or is judged to warrant feelings of 
repulsion and yet is nonetheless found to be or to merit attraction or compulsion. The attraction arises from one 
or more of the following functions: the object is taken to indulge first order desires internalized as immoral that 
the agent has; the object is taken to indulge the second order desire to be morally transgressive or the second 
order desire to delight in the first order feelings of repulsion; the object taken to indulge responses internalized 
as immoral is taken to reward cognitive interests such as curiosity or fascination. 
 Although the paradigmatic kinds of cases were described in terms of objects actually being found 
repulsive and attractive, this is not a strict requirement. For we can and often do recognize that an object we do 
not find both attractive and repulsive may appropriately be found to be so, in ways we take to be immoral, by 
people whose interests and character though intelligible are nonetheless relevantly different from our own. The 
judgment of obscenity is, in this regard, similar to a judgment of moral offence - we often judge certain actions 
or representations to be morally offensive without ourselves necessarily being or feeling offended. 
 The characterization captures the core features of the paradigmatic kinds of cases of judgments of 
obscenity. In recognizing the central elements of repulsion and attraction the account is able to explain precisely 
why people tend to get so worked up about things they deem to be obscene. For despite people’s internal 
recognition that the responses solicited or elicited are immoral nonetheless they find themselves attracted to 
indulging them for the reasons given above. This is, naturally, something we find deeply uncomfortable and it is 
this that explains the stridency of condemnation associated with judgments of obscenity. In so doing the account 
clearly distinguishes judgments of obscenity from straightforward common or garden judgments of moral 
offensiveness that do not involve an element of attraction. The account also distinguishes judgments of 
obscenity from judgments of the merely grotesque or horrific where there is no sense of moral abrogation 
involved. It should also be noted that the moral prohibitions relevantly abrogated are those that are internalized 
as distinct from those consciously believed or accepted. For someone may intellectually reject the belief that 
pornography per se is immoral and yet, because of the moral prohibitions enculturated and internalized, not yet 
respond to pornography in ways consistent with this belief. We should be careful to avoid over-intellectualizing 
judgments of obscenity and the responses involved to what, primarily, is a visceral felt response more akin to 
feeling than thought. Judgments of obscenity arise from deep within and are more closely related to kinesthetic 
gut reactions to the attitudes and interests as manifest in the object of our judgment than considered, intellectual 
judgments. 
 Moreover, the account allows for the recognition that context can play a crucial part in judgments of 
obscenity. Objects which in isolation or in terms of their authorized purpose may not give rise to the judgment 
of obscenity may nonetheless do so in different contexts or when made to serve different purposes. Innocent 
photographs of children when used in a collage that speaks to pedophiliac desires may be deemed obscene 
where they are constituent parts of the object whose purpose is to solicit responses internalized as immoral. 
 However, before formalizing the account into a strict definition we should bear in mind an important 
distinction that relates to the point about context. Many of the objects we deem to be obscene are 
representations produced in forms the function of which are to solicit and indulge responses commonly held to 
be immoral, though nonetheless found attractive for the reasons given above. Snuff movies, pedophiliac 
pornography or pornography of a viciously violent or misogynistic kind most obviously come to mind. 
Anything that belongs to a central form that has the function of being obscene is obscene whether it successfully 
realizes its purpose or not. This condition is, however, strongly defeasible rather than absolute. A completely 
useless director trying to make pedophiliac pornography, an Ed Wood Jr. of the porn industry let us say, may 
fail so completely that the resultant movie is not even recognizably pornography. Just as, by analogy, 
someone’s juvenilia may be so bad as to fail to constitute poetry. But anything that is recognizably pedophiliac 
pornography, whether or not it successfully elicits the sought for responses, is obscene by virtue of its 
authorized function or purpose. By contrast objects that are not in such central forms are not properly judged 
obscene unless they do in fact elicit the responses of repulsion, as an upshot of internal moral prohibition, and 
attraction, for the reasons given. 
 On the basis of the above considerations the appropriate formalized definition of a proper judgment of 
obscenity must be as follows: 
 
x is appropriately judged obscene if and only if either A/ x is appropriately classified as a member of a form or 
class of objects whose authorized purpose is to solicit and commend to us cognitive-affective responses which 
are (1) internalized as morally prohibited and (2) does so in ways found to be or which are held to warrant 
repulsion and (3) does so in order to a/ indulge first order desires held to be morally prohibited or b/ indulge the 
desire to be morally transgressive or the desire to feel repulsed or c/ afford cognitive rewards or d/ any 
combination thereof or B/ x successfully elicits cognitive-affective responses which conform to conditions (1)-
(3). 
 
 An important virtue of the account as formalized is the recognition of the relativity, both at the 
individual and cultural level, of judgments of obscenity. Different cultures or the same culture at different times 
tend to judge different things to be obscene. This is explained by the socio-cultural variance in what is 
internalized as morally prohibited. A puritanical culture will, for example, judge many more things to be 
obscene than a predominantly liberal culture. Similarly within the same society, especially within a liberal 
culture, there will be a fair degree of divergence over some fundamental moral prohibitions. This explains why, 
for example, for some pornography as such not only was but is taken as obviously remaining an appropriate 
object of a judgment of obscenity whilst for others, unless the pornography involved solicits responses tied up 
with vicious violence or extreme misogyny, it is far from obvious. Indeed even over the last thirty years in 
contemporary Western culture there has been a massive shift regarding what is commonly held to be obscene. 
Whether this reflects well or badly on our culture depends upon whether certain things previously regarded as 
morally prohibited but no longer thought to be so really are or not. But that is a question not about what 
constitutes a judgment of obscenity proper but whether something is really obscene. Whether a proper judgment 
of obscenity is really merited can only be resolved by showing whether the moral prohibitions implicit in a 
proper judgment of obscenity are warranted or not.  However, I take it that we can agree that all or most of the 
moral prohibitions involved in the paradigmatic kinds of cases adduced earlier are warranted. I cannot hope to 
settle more controversial cases - that would be far beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the account not 
only captures the central cases of judgments of obscenity, something no account thus far has managed to do, but 
also explains why there is disagreement about the controversial cases. In philosophical terms at least, that is 
progress. 
